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This paper introduces the monographic issue of Rivista di
Politica Economica on “Intellectual Property, Competition, and
Growth”. It presents the twelve contributions selected after a Call-
for-Papers. The contributions deal with different facets of the
protection of intellectual property rights and analyse micro- and
macro-economic consequences of different degree of intellectual
property protection, especially as concerns firm competition and
macroeconomic growth performance. [JEL Classification: O31,
O34, D60, G22, C22]
The knowledge of new products and processes is likely the
most important key in the current competition among firms (and
nations). However, the nature of knowledge, that is, the extent to
which knowledge can be considered as a private rather than a
public good, shapes the decisions of firms concerning several
variables, like production, research efforts, localization, as well as
the choices of Parliaments, policy makers, and Authorities
concerning the protection of the results deriving from individual
and collective research. 
The definition of property rights on intellectual findings is an
important element not only with respect to the microeconomic
decisions of firms and researchers, but also with reference to the
macroeconomic performance of nations.
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on such issues are very different across countries. Moreover, the
continuous disclosure of new technological possibilities represents
a real challenge for legal systems and asks for significant
modifications of national laws and international treaties. 
The protection of the appropriability of the results of
knowledge-enhancing investments, with its different micro- and
macro-economic aspects, can be analysed from many perspectives.
The articles in the present monographic issues of Rivista di
Politica Economica are selected after a Call-for-Papers. These
articles provide a clear demonstration of the complexity of the
themes at hand, and show that the economic outcomes from
different institutional designs of intellectual property rights can
be — and they are indeed — markedly different.
In the first contribution, Pia Weiss shows that the introduction
of a patent law can have different effects on the general welfare
of a country, since beneficial and/or detrimental effects depend on
the probability that a domestic firm wins a race for patent, and
such a probability, in turn, depends on the patent protection. 
Antoine Bureth, Rachel Levy, Julien Pénin and Sandrine Wolff,
in the second contribution, focus on the role of patent as a
strategic device in competition: the Authors claim that, beyond
the traditional motivations for firms to apply for a patent, there
is an additional rationale, namely the role of patent as a tool to
manage collaboration, coordination, or exclusion among actors of
innovative activities; such a role is also investigated in a case-study
in biomedicine.
The third article, by Gustavo Olivieri and Laura Marchegiani,
investigates the antitrust law in influencing the dynamics of a
specific segment of the information-technology market, specifically
the so-called open source software. It also studies the reverse
influence, that is, the effects of technological development in open
source software upon the necessity of new instruments for antitrust
laws.
The protection of intellectual property rights often calls for
legal actions. The paper of Christian Ben Lakhdar studies the social
costs of such litigations and investigates the possible effectiveness
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2005
4
01-Cellini-Cozzi_3_6  26-04-2006  15:17  Pagina 4and efficiency of litigation insurances. The issue is of current
interest, given that the European Commission is working at the
development of litigation insurance schemes. However, the analysis
leads to the conclusion that such schemes are far from giving clear-
cut results in terms of social welfare.
The three subsequent papers deal with industrial espionage.
Acquiring secret information and using it can give permanent
advantage to (spy)-firm; at the same time, this possibility represents
a threat, that can hamper significantly the innovation activity and
can affect heavily the behaviour of firm concerning R&D activity.
Carmelo Parrello presents a positive model to study the
macroeconomic implications of espionage activity in a framework
in which the R&D employment of firms is constituted by two types
of researchers: inventors and spies. 
Francesco Schettino analyzes the role of the US anti-spying
Acts on R&D patent dynamics: empirical evaluation suggests that
the acts have been really effective in influencing the R&D efforts
in “new” industries.
Guido Cozzi and Angelo Pietrosanti provide evidence
documenting that the situation is very heterogeneous across
European countries; however, no European country has a law
comparable to the US, as concerns the punishment of spying
activities. Civil and criminal sanctions against spying are really soft
in Europe; this leads to conclude that the protection of intellectual
findings is rather poor in Europe as compared to the US, entailing
a serious weakness of the European research environment.
Two papers with a clear Schumpeterian flavour follow, to
analyse specific consequences of competition based on intellectual
investment aimed at innovation.
Carmelo Parello and Luca Spinesi show that the patent
infringement may affect wage inequality (beside growth
performance); the theoretical links are clear: intellectual property
rights enhance human capital accumulation, and hence increase
the skill premium and — as a consequence — the wage inequality.
Alberto Bucci’s paper derives an inverted U-shaped relationship
between product market competition and growth performance. He
points out that more market competition not only affects the profit
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labour across sectors, with different effects on the profitability of
R&D and a non monotonic effect on the macroeconomic growth
performance.
Daya Shanker analyses the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, especially as concerns their
patenting provisions. The article discusses some measures able to
lessen the abuses inherent in patenting monopoly and the use of
competition policy as a tool to deal with such abuses.
The last two papers focus on the collective property rights,
especially in the field of “culture-based” goods and “traditional-
knowledge” goods.
Roberto Cellini, Tiziana Cuccia and Walter Santagata discuss
the possible effectiveness and efficiency of the introduction of
collective trademarks to protect social knowledge and analyze the
role of such trademarks in the development of local districts based
on idiosyncratic know-how.
Stefania Lionetti discusses why and how negotiations based
on mutually agreeable terms can help the economic development,
and stresses that such agreements are particularly important to
promote trade among nations with different cultures and
traditional knowledge. 
More generally, several reasons ask for international agree-
ments concerning intellectual property rights.
Innovative ideas, intellectual research, theoretical results are
increasingly important in the present age. Advances in technology,
joint with the removal of trade barriers, have made imitation and
reproduction very easy; this holds both for material goods and for
intangible ideas. Different legislations across countries mean
important distortions in cost and benefits associated to genuine
R&D, to spying activity, to copying acts.
A global governance of precise definition of property rights of
such intangible items is a pre-condition for markets to work.
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